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NORMAL ELLIPTIC BASES AND TORUS-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
CLÉMENT DUNAND AND REYNALD LERCIER
Abstract. We consider representations of algebraic tori Tn(Fq) over finite fields. We
make use of normal elliptic bases to show that, for infinitely many squarefree integers n
and infinitely many values of q, we can encode m torus elements, to a small fixed overhead
and to m ϕ(n)-tuples of Fq elements, in quasi-linear time in log q.
This improves upon previously known algorithms, which all have a quasi-quadratic
complexity. As a result, the cost of the encoding phase is now negligible in Diffie-Hellman
cryptographic schemes.
1. Introduction
Multiplicative groups defined by finite fields F×qn are of first importance in numerous
applications, especially in discrete-log based public key cryptography. In this field, Diffie
and Hellman’s seminal paper [DH76] opened the way to their use in numerous cryptographic
standards in the eighties. It turns out that elliptic curves are often prefered today, since
there exist subexponential algorithms to solve the discrete logarithm problem in finite
fields [Sch93]. But F×qn-subgroups of order Φn(q), where Φn denotes the n-th cyclotomic
polynomial (the minimal polynomial over Q of e
2ipi
n ), has reattracted attention since the
publication of Lenstra and Verheul’s xtr scheme in 2000 [LV00].
Lenstra and Verheul noticed that in the very particular case n = 6, working in the
F×
q6
-subgroup of order Φ6(q) = q
2 − q + 1 can be done with a F×
q2
arithmetic, whereas
the best way to break the system remains to solve discrete logarithms problems in F×
q6
.
Certainly, this yields reasonably competitive implementations. But the most surprising is
that xtr subgroups are, up to symmetry, generated by the relative trace Tr F
q6/Fq2
. As
a consequence, we can encode them with only two elements of Fq, with time complexity
equal to log1+o(1) q elementary operations.
In this paper, we exhibit for n > 6, n fixed, encodings that can be computed very
efficiently, that is with log1+o(1) q bit operations too. To this purpose, we start from the
interpretation of xtr-subgroups as algebraic tori, due to Rubin and Silverberg [RS03], and
the explicit encoding proposed by van Dĳk and Woodruff [DW04].
Algebraic tori over Fq are algebraic groups defined over Fq that are isomorphic to some
(Gm)
d over Fq, where Gm denotes the multiplicative group and d is the dimension of the
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torus. Algebraic tori involved here are
Tn(Fq) ∼=
{
x ∈ F×qn : NFqn/F (x) = 1 whenever Fq ⊂ F ( Fqn , F a field
}
. (1.1)
These are algebraic varieties of dimension d = ϕ(n), where ϕ is the Euler-totient function.
It turns out that in terms of group, Tn(Fq) is a subgroup of order Φn(q), that is Tn(Fq) ∼=
{x ∈ F×qn : xΦn(q) = 1} . An efficient rational parameterization of these tori with ϕ(n)-
tuples instead of n-tuples would thus allow the same security as in F×qn , but a reduced
communication cost. Even though practical constructions exist for particular values of
n (for instance, 2, 3 or 6 with luc [SL93], xtr[LV00] or ceilidh[RS03]), the rationality
or stable rationality of such structures for every n has been a concern for several years
now [Vos91].
A nice workaround proposed by van Dĳk and Woodruff [DW04] consists in adding to
the torus Tn(Fq) some well chosen finite fields and mapping the whole set into another
product of finite fields,
θ : Tn(Fq)×
∏
d |n
µ(n/d)=−1
F×
qd
→
∏
d |n
µ(n/d)=+1
F×
qd
, (1.2)
where µ is the Moebius function. This bĳection enables to compactly represent m elements
of Tn(Fq) with roughly mϕ(n) elements in Fq for large enough m. For well chosen q and
n, mainly n a product of distinct primes and q of maximal order modulo these primes,
evaluating θ requires at least n3+o(1) log2+o(1) q elementary operations.
In the present work, we observe that the heaviest part of the complexity comes from
exponentiations in Fqn to powers with sparse decomposition in basis q and we succeed
in speeding up the algorithm with the help of a new representation of field extensions.
Couveignes and Lercier recently constructed a new family of normal bases, called normal
elliptic bases [CL09]. They allow to perform low cost arithmetic in Fqn and in the context
of tori this yields encodings with a log q smaller computational cost. In order to reach this
complexity, we need inputs q and n such that Φe(q) and Φf (q) are relatively prime for any
distinct divisors e and f of n. This is not a big restriction in applications, since there are
infinitely many n and q such that this condition holds.
It is worth to notice that the encoding cost becomes negligible in regard of the major
cost in many Diffie-Hellman cryptosystems, n2+o(1) log2+o(1) q bit operations, due to expo-
nentiations in Fqn . This is particularly interesting since in cryptographic applications q
tends to be a large number and n rather small.
We may also remark that these ideas can be easily adapted to the improved variant of θ
introduced by Dĳk et al. in 2005 [DGP+05]. They substitute tori of small dimensions for
the finite fields Fqd in Eq. (1.2), but all the calculations still take place in Fqn and can be
sped up thanks to normal elliptic bases.
Outline. In Section 2, we present some background materials about algebraic tori encod-
ings. Section 3 outlines some nice cyclotomic properties of these algorithms and shows how
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the use of a normal elliptic basis can yield a log q speedup. Section 4 discusses some of the
cryptographic applications of these mappings.
2. Explicit Algebraic Tori Encodings
Van Dĳk and Woodruff first proposed an algorithmic way to encode efficiently a torus
Tn(Fq), modulo some small constraints on q and n [DW04].
2.1. Principles. We start from the embedding Tn(Fq) →֒ F×q and we complete both sides
with the missing parts in order to create a bĳection.
From qn−1 =∏d |nΦd(q), we have F×q ≃∏d |n Td(Fq). Van Dĳk and Woodruff first add
the product
∏
d |n,d6=n Td(Fq) to the left hand side of the embedding. Then, they identify
factors of the form F×
qd
with d |n in this expression. At this step, we may have to add some
newer tori, of smaller dimension. As a result, this will modify the right hand side too. But
again, we identify there factors of the form F×
qd
. After enough such iterations, this yields a
bĳection θ (cf. Eq. (1.2)).
The domain of this bĳection is much larger than Tn(Fq), but in the case where we have
m elements of Tn(Fq) to encode, we can nevertheless recover a quasi optimal encoding rate.
We refer to Section 4.1 for details.
Example. Let us see how it works for n = 15. We have
T1(Fq)× T3(Fq)× T5(Fq)× T15(Fq) ≃ F×q15 .
So, (T1(Fq)× T3(Fq))× (T1(Fq)× T5(Fq))× T15(Fq) ≃ F×q15 × T1(Fq), hence the bĳection
F×
q3
× F×
q5
× T15(Fq) ∼−→ F×q15 × F×q ,
since
T1(Fq) ≃ F×q , T3(Fq)× T1(Fq) ≃ F×q3 and T5(Fq)× T1(Fq) ≃ F×q5 .
Let us remark that there is no guarantee that the Φd(q)’s are coprime, and thus this
bĳection may not be a group isomorphism.
2.2. Explicit Encodings. We now show how we can explicitly construct the bĳection θ.
We can obtain its inverse in the same way, but for the sake of simplicity, we omit details.
For all d |n, call Ud the smallest positive integer such that
∀e | d, ∀f | d with e 6= f, gcd
(
Φe(q),Φf (q),
qd − 1
Ud
)
= 1. (2.1)
For e | d |n, let furthermore yd,e = gcd
(
Φe(q), (q
d − 1)/Ud
)
and zd,e = gcd(Φe(q), Ud). Let
finally wd, wd,e and ud,e, vd,e be the coefficients in Bézout’s relations
qd − 1
Ud
wd +
∑
e | d
qd − 1
yd,e
wd,e = 1 and
Φe(q)
yd,e
ud,e +
Φe(q)
zd,e
vd,e = 1 . (2.2)
4 CLÉMENT DUNAND AND REYNALD LERCIER
With the notations above, we have the following bĳections, for all d |n,
F×
qd
∼−→ Z/UdZ×
∏
e | d
Z/yd,eZ and Z/UdZ
∼−→
∏
e | d
Z/zd,eZ .
These two successive bĳections give a full decomposition of each Fqd into
∏
e | d
Z/yd,eZ

×

∏
e | d
Z/zd,eZ

 .
The first bĳection is a canonical bĳection given by the Chinese remainder theorem,
whereas the second one is non-canonical and can be performed by a table lookup. Van
Dĳk and Woodruff have proved that these tables are of reasonable size when some technical
conditions are satisfied by n and q, mainly n being a product of distinct primes and q of
maximal order modulo these primes.
The idea is now to give a decomposition of both sides of the bĳection θ and to identify
the small groups on each sides. The same groups appear in a different order, except
Tn(Fq) which is mapped into Z/yn,nZ × Z/Zn,nZ. For each d |n, d 6= n, we identify∏
e | d Z/zd,eZ −→
∏
e | d Z/zρe(d),eZ where ρe is the bĳection
ρe : {d : e | d |n, µ(n/d) = 1} ∼−→ {d : e | d |n, µ(n/d) = −1} .
All in all, we obtain Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Computation of θ.
Input: x ∈ Tn(Fq) and xd ∈ F×qd for all d |n such that µ(n/d) = −1.
Output: xd ∈ F×qd for all d |n such that µ(n/d) = 1.
foreach d |n such that µ(n/d) = −1 do1
Compute xd 7→ x(q
d−1)/Ud
d , the canonical map F
×
qd
→ Z/UdZ .2
Compute x
(qd−1)/Ud
d 7→ (Zd,e)e | d, the table lookup Z/UdZ→
∏
e | d Z/zd,eZ .3
Map (Zd,e)e | d 7→ (Zρe(d),e)e | d with Zρe(d),e = (Zvd,ed,e x(q
d−1)ud,e/yd,e
d )
Φe(q)/zρe(d),e , that is4
map
∏
e | d Z/zd,eZ→
∏
e | d Z/zρe(d),eZ .
end5
Compute Zn,n = x
Φn(q)/zn,n ∈ Z/zρ(n),nZ.6
foreach d |n such that µ(n/d) = 1 do7
Compute (Zd,e)e | d 7→ Zd, the table lookup
∏
ρe(d
′)=d,e | d
e6=d
Z/zd′,eZ→ Z/UdZ .
8
Compute xd = Z
wd
d
∏
ρe(d
′)=d,e | d
e6=d
(Z
vd′,e
d′,e x
(qd
′
−1)ud′,e/yd′,e
d′ )
Φe(q)wd,e/yd,e ∈ F×
qd
.
9
end10
Multiply xn by x
Φn(q)wn,n/yn,n .11
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Example. We focus again on the case n = 15, with Ud = 1 for all d |n which gives good
insights of what actually happens. We sketch the construction on Fig. 1.
T15 × F×q5 × F×q3 θ // F×q × F×q15
x_

x56
  

~~
x36
(1)
  

~~
x1 x15
T1 × T5 T1 × T3 T1 × T3 × T5 × T15
x x
Φ5(q)
5 , x
q−1
5 x
Φ3(q)
3 , x
q−1
3
 (2) // x1
_
OO
(t1, t3, t5, t15)

(3)
77
'
ll
Figure 1. The bĳection θ for n = 15 and U1 = U3 = U5 = U15 = 1.
We have here several simplifications. For every e | d, yd,e = Φe(q) and zd,e = 1. Then
the groups Z/yd,eZ involved are nothing but the tori Te(Fq). Besides ud,e = 1 and
vd,e = 0. Eq. (2.2) becomes
∑
e | d
qd−1
Φe(q)
wd,e = 1 , and x15 is simply given by x15 =
t
w15,1
1 t
w15,3
3 t
w15,5
5 t
w15,15
15 .
An explicit computation shows that the w15,e’s have a convenient common denominator,
namely 15. So, x15 = (t
r1
1 t
r3
3 t
r5
5 t
r15
15 )
1/15, where the re’s are convenient polynomials in q,

r1 = 1,
r3 = −q − 2,
r5 = −q3 − 2 q2 − 3 q − 4,
r15 = q
7 − 3 q5 + 4 q4 − 5 q3 + 7 q − 8.
The cost is as follows (cf. Fig. 1).
Phase (1) : Exponentiations to the powers q − 1, Φ3(q) = q2 + q + 1 and Φ5(q) =
q4 + q3 + q2 + q + 1 cost in average, respectively, 12 log q,
1
2 (2 log q) and
1
2(4 log q)
multiplications since we perform exponentiations to power of the sizes q, q2 and q4.
Phase (2) : Negligible.
Phase (3) : Recall the expressions of the re’s. Exponentiation to these powers de-
mands in average deg re × (12 log q). So altogether: (0 + 1 + 3 + 7)× (12 log q).
This elementary calculation shows that, in average, the cost is about 9 log q multiplications
in Fq15, that is log
2+o(1) q elementary operations. Van Dĳk and Woodruff propose some
insights to improve this cost in practice (multi-exponentiations, redundancies, etc.), but
the asymptotic complexity remains quasi-quadratic in log q.
2.3. Computational Complexities. We can now state more precisely the complexity of
Algorithm 1.
We first construct an irreducible polynomial P (X) of degree n over Fq, which can be done
in n2+o(1) log2+o(1) q operations [PR98]. Let α = X mod P (X). Then (1, α, . . . , αn−1) is
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an Fq-basis of Fqn . Additions, subtractions and comparisons require O(n log q) elementary
operations. Multiplications and divisions require n1+o(1) log1+o(1) q elementary operations.
We also have to handle basis changes between Fqn and its subfields Fqd . There are d(n)
such subfields, where d(n) is the divisor function. This may yield large finite field lattices
(see Fig. 2 for an example). To simplify things, and since it does not change the complexity,
we consider that Fqd elements for d |n are given in the basis (1, α, . . . , αn−1) too. So, we
can easily multiply elements given in two distinct subfields. Just, in order to obtain the
right dimensions for inputs or outputs of the algorithm, we apply to an Fqd element given
in Fqn an Fq-linear compression derived from equations of the type x
qd = x. This yields
matrices An,d ∈ Mn,d(Fq) for the embedding Fqd →֒ Fqn . Building and applying such a
matrix costs at most n3 multiplications in Fq. Since there are d(n) ≃ no(1) of them, this
yields a total cost of n3+o(1) log1+o(1) q bit operations.
Van Dĳk and Woodruff outline that for “reasonable” integers n and q, mainly n a
product of distinct primes and q of maximal order modulo these primes, table lookup costs
are negligible and the main costs are Step 4 and Step 9 of the algorithm. They involve
exponents which are derived from cyclotomic polynomials. Computing Φn can be done
in time essentially equal to its size (start from complex floating point approximations of
primitive n-th roots of unity and reconstruct Φn from these roots). We know that this
is a polynomial of degree ϕ(n) with coefficients upperbounded by nd(n)/2 [Erd46, Bat49],
that is a size of at most n1+o(1) bits. Evaluating all the Φd’s at q yields exponents with
d log q bits and can be done with n2+o(1) log1+o(1) q elementary operations. Using finally
the approximate growth rate
∑
d |n d ≃ n1+o(1), the total cost of Step 4 and Step 9 is equal
to n3+o(1) log2+o(1) q.
Fqef Fqn
Fqe
yyyyyy
Fqed
yyyyyy
Fqf Fqdf
Fq


yyyyyy
Fqd
yyyyyy

Figure 2. Finite field lattices for n = def , a product of three distinct primes.
3. Elliptic Periods and Algebraic Tori
We now focus on the case Ud = 1 for every d |n. That is no big restriction, at least for
cryptographic purposes. Indeed Lemma 1 in Section 3.1 shows that we can find infinitely
many values of q for infinitely many values of n working.
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We observe in Section 3.3 that most of the exponentiations occuring in Algorithm 1
involve exponents with a sparse decomposition in basis q. This yields interests for handling
Fqn with a normal basis (α,α
q , . . . , αq
n−1
) instead of a power basis (1, α, . . . , αn−1), since
with such a choice q-th powers become inexpensive. Since we need to multiply elements of
Fqn in quasi-linear time too, normal elliptic basis are a natural choice that we introduce in
Section 3.2.
3.1. Restrictions on n and q. For squarefree integers n, we can prove the following
result.
Lemma 1. For infinitely many squarefree integers n, there are infinitely many values of q
such that Ud = 1 for all d |n.
Proof. From Eq. (2.1), we deduce
Ud = 1⇔ ∀e | d, ∀f | d e 6= f, gcd(Φe(q),Φf (q)) = 1 . (3.1)
The right hand side condition is always satisfied when Res(Φe,Φf ) = 1 and it is widely
known that this is equivalent to the condition f 6= e pi with p prime and i > 1 (see [Dun09]
for a proof). This is a corollary of the following formula due to Apostol [Apo70], for
f > e > 1,
Res(Φf ,Φe) =
∏
d | e
p prime, f
(f,d)
=pi
p
µ(e/d) ϕ(f)
ϕ(pi) . (3.2)
There remains to check that when f = e pi, there exist integers q such that Eq. (3.1) is
satisfied. Since n is supposed to be squarefree, the only cases are f = ep, p prime.
Case e = 1: The divisor f is then equal to the prime p and Res(Φ1,Φf ) = f . In
order to have gcd(Φe(q),Φf (q)) = 1, q must not be a common root of Φe and Φf
modulo f . In other words, we must have q 6≡ 1 mod f .
Case e > 1: The divisor f is then equal to pe where p is a prime. Since e is squarefree,
we know from Eq. (3.2) that Res(Φe,Φpe) = p
ϕ(e). So, q must not be a common
root of Φe and Φpe modulo p. Modulo p, Φe have a decomposition into irreducible
polynomials of same degree, and this degree is equal to p mod e (cf. [LN83]). In
other words, Φe and Φpe can only have a common root when p ≡ 1 mod e. In this
case, q must not be one of the ϕ(e) roots of Φe modulo p.
The restrictions above leave infinitely many possibilities for q, at least for infinitely many
values of n. For instance let n = p(p + 2) be the product of two twin primes and q such
that q 6≡ 1 mod p and q 6≡ 1 mod (p+ 2). Besides since p+2 6≡ 1 mod p, all the conditions
above are satisfied. Thus we have a infinite family of numbers q suitable for each n, and
an infinite number of possible values for n itself. 
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3.2. Normal Elliptic Basis. We mimic here Couveignes and Lercier’s construction.
Let E/Fq be an elliptic curve given by some Weierstrass model
Y 2Z + a1XY Z + a3Y Z
2 = X3 + a2X
2Z + a4XZ
2 + a6Z
3 .
If A is a point in E(Fq), we denote by τA : E → E the translation by A. We set xA = x◦τ−A
and yA = y ◦ τ−A. If A, B and C are three pairwise distinct points in E(Fq), we define
Γ(A,B,C) =
y(C −A)− y(A−B)
x(C −A)− x(A−B) .
We define a function uA,B ∈ Fq(E) by uA,B(C) = Γ(A,B,C). It has degree two with two
simple poles, at a and b.
We can prove the following identities (with Taylor expansions at poles),

Γ(A,B,C) = Γ(B,C,A) = −Γ(B,A,C)− a1,
= −Γ(−A,−B,−C)− a1 ,
uA,B + uB,C + uC,A = Γ(A,B,C)− a1 ,
uA,BuA,C = xA + Γ(A,B,C)uA,C + Γ(A,C,B)uA,B
+a2 + xA(B) + xA(C) ,
u2A,B = xA + xB − a1uA,B + xA(B) + a2 .
(3.3)
Assume E(Fq) contains a cyclic subgroup T of order n and let I : E → E′ be the degree
n cyclic isogeny with kernel T , then the quotient E′(Fq)/I(E(Fq)) is isomorphic to T .
Take A in E′(Fq) such that A mod I(E(Fq)) generates this quotient. The fiber P =
I−1(A) =
∑
T∈T [B + T ] is an irreducible divisor. The n geometric points above A are
defined on a degree n extension of Fq (and permuted by Galois action), that is Fqn is the
residue extension of Fq(E) at P.
For k ∈ Z/nZ, we set uk = aukT,(k+1)T + b. (a and b, constants chosen such that∑
uk = 1). Then the system Θ = (uk(B))k∈Z/nZ is an Fq normal basis of Fqn .
Furthermore, there exists an algorithm with quasi-linear complexity to multiply two ele-
ments given in an elliptic normal basis, mostly based on Eq. (3.3). It consists in evaluations
and interpolations at d points R+ kT , where R ∈ E(Fq)− E[n] .
All of these yields Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 ([CL09]). To every couple (q, n) with q a prime power and n > 2 an integer
such that nq 6
√
q, one can associate a normal basis Θ(q, n) of the degree n extension of
Fq such that the following holds.
• There exists an algorithm that multiplies two elements given in Θ(q, n) at the ex-
pense of n1+o(1) log1+o(1) q elementary operations.
Here nq is such that
• vℓ(nq) = vℓ(n) if ℓ is prime to q − 1, vℓ(nq) = 0 if vℓ(n) = 0,
• vℓ(nq) = max(2vℓ(q − 1) + 1, 2vℓ(n)) if ℓ divides both q − 1 and n.
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This result can be easily extended to a result without any restriction on q and n (see
[CL09]).
3.3. Van Dĳk and Woodruff’s Encoding Revisited. Since Ud = 1 for all d |n, van
Dĳk and Woodruf’s encoding can be slightly simplified. It is not only a bĳection, but also
a group isomorphism.
For every e | d, yd,e = Φe(q) and zd,e = 1. Then the groups Z/yd,eZ involved are nothing
but the tori Te(Fq). Besides ud,e = 1 and vd,e = 0. So most of Algorithm 1 is reduced to
two main phases: the decomposition F×
qd
→ ∏e | d Te(Fq) for d any divisor of n such that
µ(n/d) = −1 on the left hand side and the reconstruction ∏e | d Te(Fq) → F×qd for d any
divisor of n such that µ(n/d) = 1 on the right hand side.
Now we need to know what we gain with a normal elliptic basis. Essentially, it makes
each exponentiation to a power of q be a simple permutation of the basis. We thus gain a
log q factor for each exponentiation of this type. It is not difficult to see that the exponents
occuring in the decomposition phase have a sparse decomposition in basis q since they
are products of evaluations of cyclotomic polynomials at q. But the reconstruction phase
is more tricky because it involves exponentiations by Bézout’s coefficients wd,e which do
not have such a nice decomposition in basis q. Instead, we prefer to compute Bézout’s
polynomials Wd,e such that ∑
e | d
Xd − 1
Φe(X)
Wd,e(X) = 1 .
Of course, wd,e = Wd,e(q) mod Φe(q) .
Unlike cyclotomic polynomials, these polynomials do not have integer coefficients, but
for squarefree integers n, and thus squarefree divisors d, all their coefficients have a common
denominator, equal to d. More precisely, we have
Wd,e(X) =
∏
f | d,f 6=e
Φf (X)
−1 mod Φe(X) . (3.4)
We may notice on the first hand that Φf (X)
−1 mod Φe(X) has got integer coefficients if
and only if f 6= e pi with p prime and i > 1, since Res(Φe,Φf ) = 1 in that case (see proof
of Lemma 1). On the other hand, when f = e pi, the coefficients of Φf (X)
−1 mod Φe(X)
have a common denominator, equal to f . From Eq. (3.4), and from the squarefree property
satisfied by d, we deduce thus that the coefficients ofWd,e(X) have a common denominator
exactly equal to d.
We observed that the numerators Rd,e of the Wd,e’s have small coefficients too (see
Section 3.3.1 for a detailed analysis in the case n = pr). Consequently, we restrict q to
prime powers such that n is invertible modulo qn − 1 and slightly modify θ to output xnd
instead of xd for each d |n such that µ(n/d) = 1. We denote θ˜ this variant (cf. Algorithm 2).
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Algorithm 2: Computation of θ˜.
Input: x ∈ Tn(Fq) and xd ∈ F×qd for all d |n such that µ(n/d) = −1.
Output: xd ∈ F×qd for all d |n such that µ(n/d) = 1.
foreach d |n such that µ(n/d) = −1 do1
Compute xd 7→ (Zρe(d),e)e | d with Zρe(d),e = x(q
d−1)/Φe(q)
d .2
end3
Set Zn,n = x.4
foreach d |n such that µ(n/d) = 1 do5
Compute xd =
∏
ρe(d′)=d,e | d
e 6=d
Z
nWd,e(q)
d′,e ∈ F×qd.
6
end7
Fortunately, we do not need any more compression matrices An,d with normal basis
(cf. Section 2.3). In truth, a Fqd element has got a periodic set of components in any
normal basis of Fqn . Consequently, compressing simply consists in truncating to the d first
components and expanding consists in concatenating n/d copies of a d-tuple of Fq elements.
Costs are negligible.
Before considering in detail the case n = pr a product of two primes in Section 3.3.1, and
discuss the general case in Section 3.3.2, we focus on an explicit example, namely n = 15
in order to compare with Section 2.2.
Example. Recall Fig. 1 for the notations, the costs are the following.
Phase (1) : Exponentiations to the powers Φ3(q) = q
2+ q+1 and Φ5(q) = q
4+ q3+
q2+ q+1 cost respectively 2 and 4 multiplications since exponentiation to a power
of q is free (mere permutation of the basis). Exponentiation to the power q − 1
costs an inversion, which is performed in linear time.
Phase (2) : Negligible.
Phase (3) : Recall the expressions of the re’s. For instance r15 = q
7 − 3 q5 + 4 q4 −
5 q3 + 7 q − 8. Exponentiation to this power demands 6× 3 multiplications for the
coefficients (6 coefficients of size at most 23) and 6 multiplications to add the 7
monomials. The same calculation for each re gives the global cost of Phase (3):
3 + ((0) + (1× 1 + 1) + (2× 2 + 2) + (6× 3 + 6)) multiplications and 3 inversions.
If we remind the total found for computations without normal elliptic bases, it is a
clear practical improvement. The most important is that asymptotically, the log q factor
vanishes.
3.3.1. Case n = pr with p, r distinct primes. In the case n = pr with p, r distinct primes,
the situation is very similar to our n = 15 example (cf. Fig. 3).
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Tn × F×qp × F×qr // F×q × F×qpr
x_

xp6
  
	
~~
xr6
(1)
!!

}}
xn1 x
n
pr
T1 × Tp T1 × Tr T1 × Tp × Tr × Tpr
x x
Φp(q)
p , x
q−1
p x
Φr(q)
r , x
q−1
r
(2) // x1
_
OO
(t1, tp, tr, tpr)

(3)
77
'
ll
Figure 3. The bĳection θ˜ for n = pr and U1 = Up = Ur = Upr = 1.
Especially, the cost of Phase (1) comes from exponentiations to the powers Φp(q) and
Φr(q), that is p and r multiplications since exponentiation to a power of q is free. This
costs n2+o(1) log1+o(1) q bit operations. Exponentiation to the power q−1 costs an inversion,
which is asymptotically performed in quasi-linear time.
We now give details on the cost of Phase (3). We perform the embedding in two steps.
First, we combine t1 and tpr on one hand and tp and tr on the other hand. Then, we
combine the two results again to form the element xpr. We summarize this process on
Fig. 4.
(T1(Fq)× Tpr(Fq))×(Tp(Fq)× Tr(Fq)) // F×qpr
(t1, tpr)6
##
, (tp, tr)
	
{{
xpr = y
v1
1 y
v2
2
G1 × G2
y1 = t
u1
1 t
upr
pr y2 = t
up
p turr

JJ
Figure 4. Reconstruction step in the case n = pr.
So the first step consists in two mappings,
T1(Fq)× Tpr(Fq) ∼−→ G1 ⊂ F×qpr ,
(t1, tpr) 7→ y1 = tu11 tuprpr ,
where Φpr(q)u1 +Φ1(q)upr = 1
and
Tp(Fq)× Tr(Fq) ∼−→ G2 ⊂ F×qpr
(tp, tr) 7→ y2 = tupp turr
where Φr(q)up +Φp(q)ur = 1 .
The final recombination is
G1 ×G2 → F×qpr
(y1, y2) 7→ yv11 yv22
where
qpr − 1
Φ1(q)Φpr(q)
v1 +
qpr − 1
Φp(q)Φr(q)
v2 = 1 .
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The powers involved in the mappings of the first step, u1, up, ur and upr are the eval-
uations in q of respectively Φ−1pr mod Φ1, Φr
−1 mod Φp, Φp
−1 mod Φr, Φ1
−1 mod Φpr. Ac-
tually, the n-th cyclotomic polynomial has small coefficients, n1+o(1) bits (cf. Section 2.3),
and its computation can be done with n2+o(1) elementary operations.
We would need similar magnitude results for modular inverses of cyclotomic polynomials.
To that end, Dunand recently found such bounds.
Theorem 2 ([Dun09]). For all p and r distinct prime numbers,
(i) Φ−1p mod Φ1 = 1/p and Φ
−1
1 mod Φp = (−1/p)(Xp−2 + 2Xp−3 + . . . + p− 1).
(ii) Φ−1pr mod Φ1 = 1 and Φ
−1
1 mod Φpr =
∑ϕ(pr)−1
i=0 viX
i with vi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
(iii) Φ−1pr mod Φp =
1
r
∑d
i=0X
i with d ≡ r−1 mod p and Φ−1p mod Φpr = 1r
∑ϕ(pr)−1
i=0 viX
i
with vi < r.
(iv) Φ−1p mod Φr =
∑ϕ(r)−1
i=0 viX
i with vi ∈ {0,−1,+1}.
The decomposition of u1, up, ur and upr in basis q is very sparse, with only -1, 0, or 1
coefficients. The complexity of this step is thus O(n) multiplications and few inversions in
Fqn , that is n
2+o(1) log1+o(1) q elementary operations.
The powers in the second step, v1 and v2, are the evaluations in q of respectively
Φ−1p Φ
−1
r mod Φ1Φpr and Φ
−1
1 Φ
−1
pr mod ΦpΦr. Their computations require the knowledge
of Φ−1p modulo Φ1 and Φpr, Φ
−1
r modulo Φ1 and Φpr, Φ
−1
1 modulo Φp and Φr and fi-
nally Φ−1pr modulo Φp and Φr. To compute inverses modulo a product of two cyclotomic
polynomials, we make use of the Chinese remainder theorem. If Φ = A mod Φpr and
Φ = B mod Φ1, then
Φ =
(
Φ1
Φ1 mod Φpr
A+
Φpr
Φpr mod Φ1
B
)
mod Φ1Φpr .
And we have of course a similar formula for the second case. This yields the following
coefficient bounds (in absolute value),
Φ−1p mod Φ1Φpr = Φ1︸︷︷︸
at most 1
(Φ−11 mod Φpr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
at most 1
(Φ−1p mod Φpr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1/p
+ Φpr︸︷︷︸
at most 1
(Φ−1pr mod Φ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
(Φ−1p mod Φ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
at most r
modΦ1Φpr (3.5)
We have such a bound for Φ−1r mod Φ1Φpr too (exchange p and r in Eq. (3.5)).
Finally v1 is the product of Φ
−1
p and Φ
−1
r modulo Φ1Φpr. The factor 1/pr appearing
leads us to return xnpr instead of xpr. So the powers involved in the last step will be nv1 and
nv2. A very quick analysis show that the coefficients of their decomposition in basis q are
upperbounded in absolute value by n5 and this impacts the complexity by an additional
but negligible no(1) penalty. The total complexity of the reconstruction phase is thus equal
to n2+o(1) log1+o(1) q elementary operations.
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As a conclusion, our variant of the bĳection θ asymptotically costs, for n = pr the
product of two primes, n2+o(1) log1+o(1) q elementary operations.
3.3.2. Case of integers n with more than two prime factors. The decomposition phase
is the easiest to quantify for general n. We have to perform exponentiations to powers
equal to cyclotomic polynomials evaluated at q. Since we have at most d(n) = no(1) such
polynomials, since they are of degree at most n and since their coefficients have got n1+o(1)
bits, this yields a clear n3+o(1) log1+o(1) q bit complexity.
The reconstruction phase involves modular inverses of cyclotomic polynomials and with
our current knowledge, is seems very difficult to have in full generality bounds similar
to Dunand’s ones in the case n = pr. It seems, but we have no proof of this, that for
integers n with a fixed number of prime factors, the coefficients of these cyclotomic inverses
are upperbounded in absolute value by a fixed power of n. And so, the reconstruction
complexity would not exceed the complexity of the decomposition phase.
For more general integers n, it is very hard to state something, except of course that the
complexity is no longer quasi-quadratic, but quasi-linear, in log q .
4. Cryptographic Applications
In [DW04], van Dĳk and Woodruff give several applications, including a Diffie-Hellman-
like multiple key exchange. We show here how this scheme can be adapted to our case.
4.1. Key agreement. We denote in the following θ : Tn(Fq)×Π− → Π+ , the bĳection θ
initially defined by Eq. (1.2).
Let us assume that Alice and Bob need to agree not on a single key but on a sequence
(Ki)16i6m of keys, with a Diffie-Hellman based system. Indeed, after having agreed on a
generator g of Tn(Fq), each of the keys will be Ki = g
xiyi where xi and yi will be randomly
chosen respectively by Alice and Bob.
Alice computes the points Ai = g
xi on the torus and after having chosen a random
S0 ∈ Π−, she computes in turn θ(Ai, Si−1) = (ai, Si) for i from 1 to m. She sends the
(ai)16i6m and the last output Sm to Bob. So he can recover all the Ai’s by applying
θ−1(ai, Si) = (Ai, Si−1) for i decreasing from m to 1. Finally the key is Ki = A
yi
i .
In this way, Sm and a1, . . ., am encode A1, . . . , Am. This encoding is optimal except
the small overhead Sm, that is negligible for a large enough m.
Similarly, if Bob chooses T0 ∈ Π− and computes successively (bi, Ti) = θ(Bi, Ti−1), he
can send (bi)i and Tm to Alice, who can recover (Bi)i by (Bi, Ti−1) = θ
−1(bi, Ti), for i from
m to 1. Then Ki = B
xi
i gives the keys.
4.2. Adaptation. We need to modify this system since our bĳection θ˜ is not exactly the
same.
We focus here on the case n = pr but it works in the same way for more general integers
n. We want to use the bĳection given in Fig. 3. Yet what we can efficiently calculate in
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the third step is (t1, tp, tr, tpr) 7→ xnpr. So we are going to use the slightly different mapping
θ˜ and a reverse mapping θ˜′,
θ˜ : Tn(Fq)× F×qp × F×qr → F×q × F×qn ,
(x, xp, xr) 7→ (xn1 , xnn) ,
and
θ˜′ : F×q × F×qn → Tn(Fq)× F×qp × F×qr ,
(x1, xn) 7→ (xn, xnp , xnr ) .
Since θ˜′ ◦ θ˜(x, xp, xr) is no longer equal to (x, xp, xr) but to (xn2 , xn2p , xn
2
r ), we cannot
make a direct use of the previous Diffie Hellman scheme. We have to raise the output of
our mappings to the 1/n-th power instead. This can be easily done by a straightforward
exponentiation, but at cost n2+o(1) log2+o(1) q.
It turns out that this cost can be decreased, but at the expense of an additional constraint
on q.
Lemma 2. Let n be an odd integer, let q be a prime power such that n divides q + 1 and
denote k = (n− 1)/2, then
1/n mod (qn − 1) = µ0 + µ1 q + µ0 q2 + · · ·+ µ1 qn−2 + µ0 qn−1 , (4.1)
where
µ0 =
k(q − 1) + q
n
and µ1 =
k(q − 1)− 1
n
.
Proof. We have
n (µ0 + µ1 q + µ0 q
2 + · · ·+ µ1 qn−2 + µ0 qn−1)− 1− k (qn − 1) =
kqn+2 + nµ0 q
1+n + nqn (µ1 − k)− (k + 1) q2 − nµ1 q − nµ0 + k + 1
q2 − 1 .
The numerator of the right hand side is thus equal to
qn(kq2 + nµ0q + n(µ1 − k))− (k + 1) q2 − nµ1 q − nµ0 + k + 1
and then we need to check that the coefficient of qn and the remaining part of this expression
are both equal to zero with µ0 and µ1 as given above. 
Raising elements of Fqn to the 1/n-th power where 1/n is given by Eq. (4.1) can be done
with n1+o(1) log2+o(1) q elementary operations with a normal basis. The global asymptotical
cost of the encodings in the key agreement is thus in this case m times n2+o(1) log1+o(1) q+
n1+o(1) log2+o(1) q bit operations. This is smaller than m times n2+o(1) log2+o(1) q, the cost
of m Diffie-Hellman exponentiations.
Remark. Computing n-th roots in Fqn excludes even integers n in the construction, at
least for odd prime powers q. But an easy workaround consists in working in the quadratic
residue subgroup of T1(Fq) and T2(Fq). This is equivalent to substitute (q − 1)/2 and
(q + 1)/2 for Φ1(q) and Φ2(q) everywhere in the construction of θ˜. So, we are left at the
end to compute n/2-th roots in Fqn and all of these do not change the overall complexity
of the scheme.
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